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1. Introduction 
Coopetition — collaboration between competitors — is increasingly discussed as a strategy 
for new product development (NPD) (e.g. Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Yami and Nemeh, 2014; 
Fernandez et al., 2014). Coopetition facilitates the creation of more new products than 
collaboration between non-competitors (Tether, 2002; Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-
Velasco, 2004) by enabling the use of joint market and technological knowledge, leading to 
more effective innovation generation and diffusion (Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; 
Yami and Nemeh, 2014). However, the literature lacks concensus on the role of coopetition in 
incremental and radical innovation (Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Bouncken and 
Fredrich, 2012). Several studies find that coopetition is advantageous for radical innovation 
(Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; Dussauge et al., 2000), and even more beneficial than for 
incremental innovation (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2012). Conversely, some studies find lower 
benefits for  radical innovation than for incremental innovation (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007; 
Ritala and Sainio, 2014). The reasons behind these mixed results are not fully understood, and 
constitute a clear gap in the literature. 
In this study, we argue that these mixed results arise from the complex nature of 
coopetition, creating multiple types of tensions (see e.g. Fernandez et al., 2014). In particular, 
in innovation-related coopetition firms come together to create value by developing new 
products, services and processes, while also seeking individually to appropriate a portion of 
the value (Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Gnyawali and Park, 2011). We claim that 
an important and so far overlooked aspect in coopetitive innovation and NPD studies is the 
phase of the NPD process the particular collaboration focuses on. Innovation researchers 
acknowledge that the front end of NPD differs significantly from the later launch phase since 
the early phases involve a lot of uncertainty (Reid and De Brentani, 2004; Bartunek et al., 
2007). Similarly, in collaborative innovation, it has also been recognized that collaborative 
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innovation includes a lot of uncertainty especially in phases where eventual value 
appropriation is still not visible (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). 
We combine the insights of earlier research in that value creation and appropriation are 
contradictory, persisting tensions of the coopetitive relationship (e.g. Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996; Ritala and Tidström, 2014; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014; Bengtsson et al., 2016; 
Gnyawali et al., 2016), with the evidence from innovation literature on differences in 
uncertainty and tensions in different phases of the NPD process and relationships. While the 
earlier research has discussed the merits of coopetition at pre-commercial phases of 
innovation (e.g. Gnyawali et al., 2006; Dussauge et al., 2000; Tidd and Trewhella, 1997), the 
launch phase of product innovation has received less attention. Lack of studies in this regard 
might be related to that most coopetition relationships (and literature) focus on pre-
commercial stages that are far away from the customer (for reviews, see Walley, 2007; 
Bouncken et al., 2015), which is also a broader tendency in the collaborative innovation and 
NPD literature (Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2012). Given that the different stages of 
NPD processes are clearly different in terms of uncertainty and tensions (Reid and De 
Brentani, 2004; Bartunek et al., 2007), we expect that examination of coopetitive NPD 
relationships in different stages provides important understanding of how firms are able to 
achieve incremental and radical innovation benefits from coopetition. Thus, in this study we 
examine the effect of coopetition intensity in different phases of NPD alliances on focal 
firm’s innovation outcomes. 
Following an introduction to the main concepts and approaches, we develop 
hypotheses concerning coopetition in different phases of NPD alliances and innovation 
outcomes. We test the hypotheses based on a survey of 1,049 NPD alliances in the medical 
and machinery sectors. Our main finding is that coopetition is beneficial for early and later 
stages of incremental innovation but in the case of radical innovation, the benefits apply only 
to the less uncertain later stages. We contribute to the literature by providing better 
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understanding of the mixed findings in relation to incremental and radical innovation benefits 
in coopetition, and more generally, to the literature focusing on collaborative innovation and 
NPD.  
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1 Coopetition and innovation types 
 Coopetition is defined as simultaneous competition and collaboration within the same 
relationship (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). In this study, we focus on coopetition intensity 
within the NPD alliance and its implications to incremental and radical innovation of the focal 
firm. In conceptualizing and measuring coopetition intensity, we build on earlier studies that 
have focused on the perception of coopetition intensity within an alliance relationship 
(Bouncken and Kraus, 2013). Thus, when we formulate the hypotheses, we examine the level 
of competitive perceptions within a particular collaborative relationship (here: NPD alliance). 
Radical innovations entail a major departure from existing technologies and products 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). In the coopetition context, 
collaboration for radical innovation creates market uncertainties and investment requirements 
that partners seek to reduce with the help of their coopetition partners (e.g. Ritala, 2012). 
These uncertainties also bring ambiguity and ambivalence, generating high tensions between 
coopetition partners (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). Tensions are likely to be most severe in the 
early phases of radical product innovation, when uncertainties add to the difficulties of 
securing proprietary knowledge. At later phases, functionalities become more visible, 
allowing firms to divide tasks between them (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014; Le Roy and Fernandez, 
2015), to define safeguards and to reduce partner opportunism.  
Incremental innovations usually involve small changes to an existing product concept 
or technology (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Dewar and 
Dutton, 1986). The process of incremental innovation in coopetition is less ambiguous and 
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uncertain, allowing partners to more easily understand the underlying mechanisms and 
enabling better separation of tasks, reducing the risk of knowledge leakage and opportunistic 
behaviour. Due to this issue, it has been suggested that coopetition might be better suited for 
incremental technological innovation, even though the results remains broadly mixed (for 
discussion, see e.g. Ritala et al., 2016). 
 
2.2 Value creation, value appropriation and tensions in innovation-related coopetition 
Coopetition-related innovation faces tensions between mutual investment in value creation 
and eventual individual returns from value appropriation (see Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2009). In economics, value defines the end customer’s willingness to pay 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996), and value creation refers to all activities designed to 
increase this value. Value appropriation refers to all those activities that capture or capitalize 
the value created. In coopetition research, one baseline assumption has been that value 
creation is typically a joint process while value appropriation is more firm-specific, as rival 
firms compete for their share of the created value (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). 
However, in coopetitive NPD alliances, joint value appropriation may also occur when 
product innovations are launched collaboratively. This follows the logic of coopetition in a 
network context, where firms collaborate with rivals to increase their competitiveness against 
the rest of the field (Lado et al., 1997; Ritala et al., 2014). There might also be differences 
related to innovation types in terms of how much tension there is in appropriating value in the 
end product markets, which we will discuss later when developing the hypotheses. 
The recent literature has highlighted the role of coopetition tensions from a number of 
perspectives (see e.g. Fernandez and Chiambaretto, 2016; Bengtsson et al., 2016; Le Roy and 
Czakon, 2016). In the broader tensions and paradox literature, tensions are caused by 
persistent contradictions and involve both negative and positive aspects that are contingent on 
context, as well as on how they are managed (e.g. Lewis, 2000; Gaim and Wåhlin, 2016). 
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Among the several reported types of contradictions within coopetitive relationships (see e.g. 
Gnyawali et al., 2016), we focus on the tension between value creation and appropriation in 
building the background arguments for differences between the early development phases and 
product launch, and related innovation outcomes in coopetitive NPD alliances. 
In terms of positive tensions, coopetition drives value creation in innovation and NPD 
because firms’ converging targets (Padula and Dagnino, 2007; Giachetti and Dagnino, 2016; 
Le Roy and Czakon, 2016) allow for increased resource complementarity and effective 
combination of market- or industry-specific knowledge and market power (Quintana-Garcia 
and Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Gnyawali and Park, 
2009; 2011). Coopetition may improve value appropriation by expanding firms’ current 
markets and facilitating the development of new markets and business models (Ritala et al., 
2014; Gast et al., 2015). 
However, the paradoxical nature of coopetition becomes visible in how this positive 
potential also creates possible threats and risks (see Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). Firms in 
coopetitive relationships have similar resources improving the mutual learning and innovation 
potential, but also easing knowledge acquisition, increasing the risk of opportunism and 
unwanted knowledge spillovers (Sampson, 2007). These hazards become more salient when 
competitive overlap is greater (Li et al., 2008), when ambiguities exist (Raza-Ullah et al., 
2014) or when protection of intellectual property is weak (Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2013). Firms need to manage these tensions and paradoxes, which may appear differently in 
various business environments (Le Roy and Fernandez, 2015).   
These tensions have distinct consequences for radical and incremental innovations and 
in the following sections we develop hypotheses based on these core insights. Using the NPD 
phases approach (e.g. Cooper, 1983; Sobrero and Roberts, 2001; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004), 
we separate the pre-launch and launch phases of coopetitive NPD and suggest that innovation 
potential and risks in coopetition differ by phase. In doing this, we follow the existing 
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literature that has suggested that firms often collaborate with different partners in different 
phases of NPD processes (e.g. Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2012). 
  
2.3. Coopetitive NPD in the pre-launch phase  
Coopetition in the pre-launch phases facilitates joint value creation through risk sharing and 
resource complementarity (Gnyawali and Park, 2009) and improves the flow of diverse 
knowledge needed to identify problems and potential solutions that are often still fuzzy (Reid 
and De Brentani, 2004). The knowledge comes not only from the competitors themselves but 
from other actors in their networks. This increases opportunities to combine, discover and 
create new knowledge that may lead to incremental or radical innovation. Coopetition may 
also involve collaboration in pre-competitive research programs, forums and projects that help 
to build a critical mass of ideas, innovations and technical standards (e.g. Gueguen, 2009; 
Mione, 2009).  
The pre-launch phase of coopetitive NPD is pre-competitive, as product markets have 
not yet formed, and immediate tensions regarding competition itself are lower (e.g. Cassiman 
et al., 2009). However, from innovation perspective, pre-launch phase entails very high 
uncertainties especially related to radical innovation pursuits (e.g. Song and Montoya‐Weiss, 
1998; Reid and De Brentani, 2004). This creates additional tension over the eventual value 
appropriation.  
The low-to-moderate change of existing technologies, products and markets involved 
in incremental innovation (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) means 
that coopetitors may experience less complexity, fuzziness and uncertainty. The underlying 
combination of resource complementarities is easier to understand, and there is thus less risk 
of opportunism (e.g. Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Based on joint assessment of 
current and future markets and technologies, coopetitors pursue to predict and distribute their 
actual and future investments in the project. This greater understanding enhances control and 
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safeguards against opportunism, especially of knowledge leakage. This lowers negative 
coopetitive tensions, which have been shown to reduce knowledge sharing (Hamel, 1991) and 
could undermine innovation outcomes. Thus, such tensions over eventual value appropriation 
are not necessarily strong, and do not hinder value creation in the pre-launch phases of 
incremental innovation, where collaboration focuses on diffusing and developing path-
dependent improvements to existing products in the interests of all parties (see also Ritala and 
Sainio, 2014).  
In summary, joint technological and market understanding coupled with a lowering of 
competitive tensions by the non-adversarial nature of the pre-launch phase suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1a. Coopetition in the pre-launch phases of NPD alliances is positively related to the 
proportion of incremental innovation in the focal firm’s product range. 
 
The challenges and advantages of radical innovations differ from those of incremental 
innovations (Chandy and Tellis, 1998). While joint market understanding, predictability of 
investments and separable project tasks facilitate incremental coopetitive innovation, radical 
innovation entails greater process interdependence, task complexity and uncertainty (Song 
and Montoya‐Weiss, 1998). The advantages of coopetition for radical innovation include 
resource complementarities, partner similarity and critical thinking, which can improve 
learning and reduce the risk of decision traps (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2012). However, 
radical innovations require a complex, dynamic, and uncertain development process, in which 
coopetitors’ joint development and sense-making creates higher risks of opportunism (e.g. Im 
and Rai, 2008), with associated risks of delays and proprietary knowledge leakage that may 
be exploited outside the coopetition project (Bayona et al., 2001). Firms that cannot prevent 
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such leakage during coopetition may suffer from lower innovation performance (Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013).  
All of these issues contribute to a major paradoxical tension. While radical innovation 
requires openness and broad-based knowledge exchange to facilitate emergence of 
serendipitous knowledge combinations, the risks of spillover and opportunism increase with 
openness and knowledge sharing, forming a ‘paradox of openness’ (Laursen and Salter, 
2014). Appropriability mechanisms such as patents, contracts, and secrecy are helpful in NPD 
alliances, and especially in coopetition context (Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). 
Yet, those mechanisms are not easy to enforce in the fuzzy context of early-stage radical 
innovation projects due to the uncertainty over outputs that should be safeguarded and the 
inefficiency of appropriability mechanisms in radical innovation (see e.g. Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen et al., 2008). Even the potential of opportunism can cause competing firms to hold 
up knowledge (Hamel, 1991). Therefore, competing firms with radical, market-disrupting 
ideas and inventions may not wish to reveal these to direct competitors but may instead prefer 
to collaborate with other actors such as key suppliers and customers. The motivation to pursue 
private benefits from coopetition could be strong and may harm radical innovation where 
common benefits are smaller than private benefits (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007).  
Because of the particular tensions of value creation and appropriation in coopetition 
for radical innovation, we do not expect the pre-launch phase of such NPD alliances to share 
the same positive consequences as for incremental innovation. This argument is based on the 
overlap of competitors’ existing market and technological knowledge (which is more useful 
for incremental innovation), and the high value-creating potential of radical ideas and 
inventions, which reduces motivation to collaborate in appropriating value. Especially in the 
early phases, radical innovation requires high inputs, often without hoped-for returns, 
accompanied by disappointments when targets are not met. Overall, the general uncertainty 
over future value creation and appropriation, as well as difficulties around protecting 
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knowledge suggest the likelihood of negative outcomes of coopetition intensity for focal 
firm’s radical innovation in pre-launch phases. 
 
H1b. Coopetition in the pre-launch phases of NPD alliances is negatively related to the 
proportion of radical innovation in the focal firm’s product range. 
 
2.4. Coopetitive NPD in the product launch phase 
For incremental and radical innovation NPD relationships, coopetition in the product launch 
phase can assist quick market entry, availability of distribution channels, fast diffusion of 
products, joint promotion, and cobranding (see e.g. Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Park et al., 
2014; Yami and Nemeh, 2014; Chiambaretto et al., 2016). As competitors encounter the same 
market conditions and customer needs, they develop useful experiences about innovation 
launch and new product diffusion. In general, the closeness to markets at this phase changes 
the dynamics of value creation and appropriation (see e.g. Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 
2012). Launch phases have lesser tensions, as uncertainty is reduced by a clearer sense of end 
product markets, and less risk of unintended and potentially harmful leakage of proprietary 
knowledge among competitors. In the launch phase firms can also work on how the 
innovation can be best marketed in their product portfolio together with their competitors 
through cobranding and marketing agreements (see Fernandez et al., 2014; Chiambaretto et 
al., 2016), or by themselves in order to differentiate (e.g. Gnyawali and Park, 2011). For 
instance, each firm’s marketing management can develop a firm-specific marketing mix 
strategy of specialized product design specifications, packaging, price, and promotion. 
While the launch phase brings more clarity about end product markets, increasing 
levels of coopetition reflects potential market overlap and related value appropriation tensions 
(Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). However, such tensions could be generally lower 
for innovation activities in comparison to e.g. regular product distribution or sales 
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collaboration (for discussion, see e.g. Chiambaretto et al., 2016), since innovation-related 
coopetition is focused on creating more value to the markets, rather than merely dividing it up 
(Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). In fact, we argue that the ex post market overlap 
of coopetitors with newly created products might not always reflect the ex ante market 
overlap between them before the NPD relationship. Further differences exist for incremental 
and radical innovations, which we will address while developing the following three 
hypotheses. 
In launching incremental innovations, there are particular benefits for horizontally 
positioned coopetitive actors in terms of joint resources, legitimacy and bargaining power, 
accelerating diffusion and market penetration (e.g. Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). 
For instance, introducing incremental innovation to markets often requires the development of 
infrastructure, processes, platforms and standards, and coopetition is helpful in these respects 
(Gueguen, 2009; Mione, 2009), as well as in building common delivery channels and 
marketing interfaces (Ritala et al., 2014; Chiambaretto et al., 2016). In this sense, competing 
firms can “embrace the similarity” in their target markets by facilitating customer adoption 
and fast market diffusion. Further, despite the similarities, firms can still establish their own 
specific marketing mix and include the incremental innovations in their product portfolio (e.g. 
Gnyawali and Park, 2011). Thus, firms can build on similarity leverage for incremental 
innovations and still adapt the innovation further to attract customers, even from other 
markets such as late adopters. 
In sum, while NPD alliance partners who are competitors may also experience value 
appropriation tensions in the product launch phase due to linkages to their ex ante overlap in 
the product markets, we expect these tensions to be outweighed by the value creation benefits 
of coopetition for the focal firm’s incremental innovation output. Based on these arguments, 
we advance the following hypothesis:  
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H2a. Coopetition in product launch phase of NPD alliances is positively related to the 
proportion of incremental innovation in the focal firm’s product range. 
 
Typically, launching a radical innovation is a difficult task that requires more than for 
incremental innovation a network with adequate legitimacy and resources (Aarikka-Stenroos 
and Sandberg, 2012). By shifting from value creation to appropriation of radically new 
opportunities, coopetitive NPD involves positive tensions including sharing of joint markets 
and technological understanding, heightening awareness of how more value can be captured 
by introducing a radical innovation that changes the logic of existing markets (see e.g. Ritala 
and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Collaboration between horizontal actors also delivers 
advantages of fast and strong market penetration, along with the use and further development 
of distribution channels, marketing tactics and market power (see e.g. Gnyawali and Park, 
2011). In this way, coopetition can increase the radical product range by enabling partners to 
launch innovative products and service solutions to a larger customer base and to more 
international markets than if acting alone (Bouncken and Kraus, 2013). The greater joint 
power of competitors helps to push the innovation into the market and more easily overcome 
thresholds in terms of distribution channels, customer awareness, and using the dynamics of 
word-of-mouth communication, even through social networks. Additionally, firms will use 
their marketing and differentiation opportunities and ‘customize’ the innovation into their 
targeted markets or niches. For instance, Gnyawali and Park (2011) analyzed the case of Sony 
and Samsung who brought new LCD technologies to the markets with a differentiated styling 
and marketing, enabling effectively to differentiate their practically similar offerings in the 
customer end. Therefore, specifics developed in the launch phase will allow firms to better fit 
into their specific customer base and to reduce the appropriation tensions that come from the 
potential market overlap. 
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 In sum, we expect major benefits of coopetition between NPD alliance partners in the 
product launch phase of radical innovation, along with many possibilities to avoid the 
downsides of competitive tension. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize a positive 
relationship as follows. 
 
H2b. Coopetition in the product launch phase of NPD alliances is positively related to the 
proportion of radical innovation in the focal firm’s product range. 
 
So far, we have developed positive hypotheses for NPD coopetition in the product launch 
phase for both incremental and radical innovation. However, differences in creation-
appropriation tensions suggest that radical innovation outcomes benefit more from an 
increasing level of coopetition within NPD alliances, because certain tensions are likely to 
arise from the competitive positioning of coopetition partners in the end product markets. In 
particular, the market overlap between competitors creates negative tensions, as sometimes a 
‘zero-sum’ logic migh be established between competitors’ end market offerings (Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). In incremental innovation, the market overlap is likely to be 
higher due to stronger existing linkages to established products and markets that the 
coopetition partners are currently operating in. This similarity in competitive position and 
related resources has suggested to create value appropriation tensions in the joint marketing 
efforts (see Fernandez et al., 2014; Chiambaretto et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, coopetitors will have developed the core of the innovation before the 
launch phase leveraging their capabilities to reduce cost and/or improve the innovation 
design. Joining forces with competitors may be especially helpful for market penetration by 
radically new products, services and business models because such markets are (by definition) 
less crowded and offer more potential for growth, even if multiple competitors also launch 
their products in those markets. Growing or new markets based on coopetition are less prone 
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to ‘zero-sum’ logic, documented in such cases as the new market in LCD TVs created by 
Sony and Samsung, where competitors used coopetition to overtake other electronics 
companies (Gnyawali and Park, 2011). While we would expect coopetition to have positive 
effects in the product launch phase for both types of innovation, we hypothesize that the effect 
may be stronger for radical innovation. We assume that the leverage for taking upon the 
benefits of networks and joint market preparation is higher for more novel and uncertain 
radical innovation, also allowing better possibilities of creating firm-specific additional value 
through more effectively using the marketing mix for ‘customizing’ the innovation. 
 
H2c. The positive relationship between coopetition and radical innovation in the product 
launch phase of NPD alliances is stronger than the positive relationship between coopetition 
and incremental innovation. 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the hypotheses and the overall arguments of our research 
framework. 
 
Table 1. Research framework: Summary of overall arguments 
 Pre-launch in coopetitive NPD Product launch in coopetitive NPD 
Incremental innovation Due to the overlaps in technological 
and market understanding between 
coopetitive firms, the inputs to 
value creation processes, as well as 
the expected incremental 
appropriation outcomes are 
relatively clear, and have low-to-
medium level of uncertainty.  
 
Coopetition is thus expected to be 
beneficial for focal firm’s 
incremental innovation output in 
pre-launch phase (H1a). 
 
As the uncertainty decreases by moving 
towards value appropriation, firms in 
coopetition can utilize their joint 
bargaining power, cobranding, delivery 
channels and infrastructure to increase the 
incremental value appropriation 
possibilities.  
 
Coopetition is thus expected to be 
beneficial for focal firm’s incremental 
innovation output in product launch phase 
(H2a). 
 
Radical innovation Expected value appropriation 
possibilities are ambiguous and 
uncertain and relevant inputs to 
radical innovation are hard to pre-
evaluate. This provides tensions to 
early value creation processes 
Radical innovations provide novel and 
diverse value creation and appropriation 
potential in the product launch phase that 
firms in coopetition can utilize for creating 
new types of value and appropriating value 
from newly created radical innovation. As 
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among coopetition partners due to 
difficult-to-predict future value 
appropriation.  
 
Coopetition is thus expected to be 
negative for focal firm’s radical 
innovation output in pre-launch 
phase (H1b). 
 
 
the radical innovation has moved from 
pre-launch to the launch phase, 
uncertainties decrease and isolation 
mechanisms and differentiation 
opportunities are more observable.  
 
Coopetition is thus expected to be positive 
for focal firm’s radical innovation output 
in pre-launch phase (H2b), and more so 
than in the case of incremental innovation 
(H2c). 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the hypotheses and the empirical model 
 
 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Industry context and sample selection 
The advantages of coopetition are critical for small firms (Bengtsson and Johansson, 2012), 
especially in high-tech industries where firms need to develop new solutions quickly 
(Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Bouncken and Kraus, 2013). With a €220 billion worldwide 
market share, one of the most promising industries worldwide is the medical device industry 
(SIC codes 3840-45), in which large firms like General Electric and Siemens as well as many 
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smaller firms compete and must constantly develop their portfolio of novel technical devices, 
both radically and incrementally. Rules and structures for product development in the medical 
device industry are very different across nations. The US for example has a much stronger 
and more formal and governmentally regulated product development which has several 
similarities to the pharmaceutical NPD. In Germany, NPD of medical devices is understood to 
become more complex and expand previous boundaries. At the same time, NPD of medical 
devices demands following stricter rules, especially before launch and lengthier processes. 
For several products, firms face similar conditions as in the US demanding long development 
times including approval and reimbursement permissions through health insurances. The 
market is still dominated by SMEs. Smaller firms in particular depend on coopetition for 
complementarities. As the third-largest market worldwide and the third-largest producer of 
medical devices (€23 billion market share; see Chatterji, 2009; Russell and Tippett, 2008), we 
chose to collect a sample from Germany.  
We also collected another Germany-based sample from the industrial and commercial 
machinery and computer equipment industry (SIC codes 3500), which is also of international 
importance (Padula et al., 2015). With sales turnover of more than €200 billion and about one 
million employees, this sector is Germany’s largest industrial employer, with an export quota 
of over 75% (see Kinkel and Som, 2007; VDMA, 2014). Being responsible for more than 
10% of all R&D expenses in the overall economy, this sector is one of the most innovation-
oriented branches in Germany. In knowledge-intensive industries characterized by process-, 
material- or product-innovation (Landau and Rosenberg, 1986), collaborative innovation is of 
great importance (e.g., Arranz and de Arroyabe, 2008), as it can lead to more incremental and 
radical innovations (e.g., Belderbos et al., 2004). Here, especially smaller firms often 
collaborate in NPD with larger competitors or form R&D networks or joint institutes together 
with competitors. 
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All together, the sample (N=1,049) included a significant proportion of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME≤250 employees) facing high innovation pressures. Thus, 
both samples relate to industries where coopetition helps firms to compete with the big 
players worldwide. Also, we believe that utilizing two samples increases the representability 
of our results. 
3.2 Data collection 
The final sample of 1,049 NPD alliances was generated from a population of 9,000 firms, 
taken from multiple databases: Hoppenstedt, Amadeus, and the German Bundesanzeiger. Data 
were collected between late 2012 and late 2013 by means of a postal paper-and-pencil survey. 
We achieved a response rate of 12% for our final sample (N=1,049). Adopting a key 
informant approach (Kumar et al., 1993), we contacted top and middle managers and asked 
them to describe one specific NPD alliance, involving a key-buyer firm, about which they had 
detailed information. Table 2 provides additional information about respondents’ profiles at 
firm, alliance and individual levels.  
 
Table 2. Sample characteristics 
N=1,049 NPD 
alliances Mean Median 
SD or 
frequency 
(1) Medicine 
(N=558) vs. 
(2) Machinery 
(N=491)a 
(1) Pre-launch 
(N=588) vs. (2) 
launch phase 
(N=461)a 
(3) mixed phases 
(N=316) vs. (4) 
launch phase only 
(N=145)a 
Number of 
employees 
1,846 65 17,211.5 (1) less 
(2) ** 
n.s. n.s. 
Sales in M€ 535.2 11 5,142.7 (1) less 
(2) ** 
n.s. n.s. 
Firm age in years 36.9 25 32.7 (1) younger 
(2) ** 
n.s. n.s. 
R&D intensity in % 17.4 10 21.0  (1) higher (2) 
* 
(1) higher (2) * n.s. 
Duration of alliance 
in years 
9.3 7 8.1 (1) shorter (2) 
** 
n.s. (3) longer (4) ** 
Tenure in years  6.4 4 6.2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Frequency of males 81.7% (1) less (2) ** n.s. n.s. 
CEO, director, ownerb 25.2% n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Marketing directorb 20.9% (1) more (2) * n.s. n.s. 
Operational/sales managementb 45.7% n.s. n.s. n.s. 
R&Db 10.7% n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Other or missing statusb 18.0% n.s. n.s. n.s. 
a Significance (**p<.01, *p<.05, n.s.=not significant) from non-parametric difference testing (median test, Mann-
Whitney-U test, and χ²-test for frequencies). 
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b Sum exceeding 100% due to multiple positions. 
 
 
For a subsample of N=572 firms (55%), we received second informants’ ratings on a short 
questionnaire of performance measures at firm level. We then assessed the potential threat of 
single-source bias by checking raters’ consistency on a model external latent scale for relative 
innovation performance yielding a strong inter-rater agreement (Pearson-rho=.37, P<.000). 
We can therefore assume no significant threat of single-source bias. 
Responding firms from the medical devices industry were significantly smaller (mean 
employees=1,214 vs. 2,564) and younger (mean firm age in years=32.9 vs. 41.5), indicating 
structural differences. Responding firms from both sectors were predominantly SMEs (78.9% 
in medicine vs. 71.9% in machinery). The medical device industry is more R&D-intense 
(mean R&D=18.8% vs. 15.7%), and has relatively shorter alliances (mean duration in 
years=8.6 vs. 10.0), which may be attributable to firms’ younger age (8.6 years younger on 
average). There were significantly more females and marketing directors in the medical 
device subsample. Comparisons of pre-launch vs. launch alliances revealed more R&D-
intensive pre-launch phases (18.7% vs. 15.7%). Firms in both industries typically follow a 
stage-gate approach for their NPD projects, where all new product ideas undergo a funnel-
shaped screening and development process where only a small proportion of initial ideas 
reaches full commercialization (Cooper, 1983). Thus, we used the prevalent Stage-Gate 
approach to examine innovation processes for our study. 
Using binary measured multiple choice items, we asked: ‘At which stage(s) of the 
innovation process does your company collaborate with this ally?’—‘concept development’, 
‘concept evaluation’, ‘planning & specification’, ‘product development’, ‘testing & 
evaluation’ and/or ‘market launch’ (Ahmed and Shepherd, 2010). For our final sample 
(N=1,049), we deleted all cases with no information on any stages. A hierarchical cluster 
analysis identified the launch phase as highly independent of other phases: (1) NPD alliances 
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excluding launch phase (N=588) and (2) NPD alliances including launch phase (N=461). The 
latter subsample was further divided into (3) NPD alliances covering at least one pre-launch 
phase in addition to the launch phase (N=316) and (4) NPD alliances at launch phase only 
(N=145) to separate theoretical overlaps of value creation and appropriation mechanisms. 
Alliance duration is significantly shorter for launch phase only NPD alliances (mean duration 
in years=8.1 vs. 10.7). 
To ensure representativeness, we checked our sample for potential non-response bias. 
The medical subsample (n=558) did not differ significantly from the medical device 
population (n=4800) in respect of firm size, firm revenue, or firm age. We compared the 
machinery subsample (n=491) and population (n=4,200) in the same way. Again, we found no 
significant differences. Both subsamples were therefore representative. 
 
3.3. Measures of constructs 
We used established multi-item scales to measure our constructs (see Table 3). All scales 
were reflectively operationalized on five-point Likert-type items. To measure our independent 
variable, we built on the idea that intensity of competition within a NPD alliance increases 
coopetition tension in the coopetition relationship (Bengtsson et al., 2016), and eventually 
affects innovation outcomes of the focal firm (Park et al., 2014). For this purpose, we would 
expect a continuous measure that examines the perceived level of coopetition intensity to be 
especially useful in testing our hypotheses. The measure of perceived coopetition (Bouncken 
and Kraus, 2013) which has been used in a number of subsequent studies was adapted for this 
purpose. To measure innovation performance, we used the predominant categorization of 
radical vs. incremental innovation developed by Dewar and Dutton (1986), asking 
respondents to estimate the proportion of radical and incremental innovation in their firm’s 
current product range and building a classification of advantages for different aspects such as 
product design, functionality, features, and quality performance (Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). 
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Our measurement models (see table 3) reveal adequate to excellent reliability, with 
convergent and discriminant validity assessed by common fit criteria of local fit (see Bagozzi, 
1988; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994) and global fit (see Hair et al., 2010).  
Table 3. Measures 
Latent construct Std. 
loading 
T-value 
(MLR) 
Coopetition (α=.79, CR=.80, AVE=.58, FL=.07)   
1. We are in close competition with our partner. .93a 37.12 
2. An active competition with our collaborator is important to us. .58 19.96 
3. Our partner is also our competitor, with whom we pursue a common goal in 
the project. 
.73 29.02 
   
Think of your current product range: Which proportion is based on...   
Radical innovation (α=.87, CR=.88, AVE=.59, FL=.53)   
... radical/completely new improvements concerning…   
1. …technology. .81a 41.10 
2. …performance. .85 51.08 
3. …customer value. .81 49.01 
4. …market. .67 25.41 
5. …design. .68 28.33 
Incremental innovation (α=.88, CR=.88, AVE=.60, FL=.52)   
 ... incremental/slight improvements concerning…   
1. …technology. .84a 44.93 
2. …performance. .83 42.06 
3. …customer value. .78 32.53 
4. …market. .71 25.53 
5. …design. .70 25.78 
a Initial loading fixed to 1 to set the scale of the construct. 
 
3.4. Control variables 
Relationship duration is an indicator of specific alliance experience and learning (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000), and trust is usually built through repetitive relationships or relationship 
duration (Gulati, 1995). Newly established coopetition projects exhibit lower trust and are 
restrictive in the exchange of specialized and heterogeneous knowledge and markets, which 
increases risk. Firm size is an important predictor of innovation (e.g. Chandy and Tellis, 2000; 
Vaona and Pianta, 2008), and R&D intensity also influences innovation outcomes (Artz et al., 
2010). Following other alliance and coopetition studies (e.g. Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-
Velasco, 2004; Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013; Park et 
al., 2014), we used the following alliance and firm-specific characteristics as control 
variables: (1) firm size, (2) firm age, (3) R&D intensity and (4) NPD alliance duration, based 
22 
 
on natural logarithms of the number of employees, number of years the firm has been in 
business and number of months the firms in the NPD alliance had been doing business with 
each other. Further, (5) an industry dummy (with machinery as baseline model) was used to 
control mean industry differences in perceived innovativeness. Finally, we binary control (6) 
NPD alliances including launch-phase in the aggregated sample. 
 
3.5. Modelling 
We applied covariance-based structural equation modelling (CB-SEM) with Mplus 7 to test 
the hypotheses. For this, different models were specified in a build-on approach, starting with 
a single group and splitting the sample into measurement model invariant groups, with factor 
means fixed at zero in one group and free in the others (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2012), 
based on three coded subgroups of NPD alliances at (1) pre-launch phases only, (2) pre-
launch phases and market launch, and (3) market-launch only. The main hypotheses H1a-H2c 
were tested in a multi-group analysis.  
Table 4 shows latent factor correlations in the data, estimated after running a 
confirmatory factor analysis. Table A1 in the Appendix additionally includes descriptive 
statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix for all manifest variables. 
Table 4. Estimated latent factor correlations 
Constructs 1 2 3 
1. Coopetition intensity .58 .01 .04 
2. Radical innovation .12*** .59 .31 
3. Incremental innovation .20*** .56*** .60 
Note: Diagonals represent average variances extracted; below are zero-order correlations and above are 
squared inter-correlations,*** p<.001. 
 
 
3.6. Robustness checks 
Several tests checked the robustness of findings. First, we followed the recommendations of 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) in developing the questionnaire to minimize potential common 
method bias by assuring respondent anonymity and reducing item ambiguity. A confirmatory 
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factor analysis allowed all items in the aggregated model to load equally on a common 
method factor. We constrained all latent factor correlations with this factor to be zero and 
compared this solution to the original model by performing a scaled chi-square difference test. 
Global model fit did not improve significantly (χ²diff,MLR=0.32, dfdiff=1, P>.10). Further, we 
applied instrumental variables in a 2-SLS approach to assess potential endogeneity of our 
final sample selection (Bascle, 2008). All hypothesized relationships remained consistent with 
our previous findings, indicating absence of such biases. 
Additionally, to check the external validity of our subjective coopetition measure, we 
were able to identify objective SIC code similarity scores for a random subsample (11%). SIC 
code similarity is an ordinal measure of objective competition intensity between alliance 
partners (Park et al., 2014). Comparing this subsample (N=119) with the remaining cases 
(N=930) showed no significant parametric or non-parametric differences in coopetition 
intensity and other firm characteristics. Both parametric (Pearson-rho=.26, P<.01) and non-
parametric (Spearman-rho=.27, P<.01) correlation analyses revealed highly significant 
positive correlations between SIC code similarity and coopetition intensity, indicating 
consistent underlying mechanisms. 
We also scrutinized the robustness of coopetition’s effect for varying relationship 
durations, firm sizes, firm ages and R&D intensities. Firm size and relationship duration 
further disentangled coopetition-related effects. Firm size positively interacts with radical 
innovation throughout both phases. Bigger firms attribute a greater performance effect to 
coopetition on radical innovation (see below in curvilinear tests). Furthermore, duration 
positively interacts with coopetition (ß=.17, P<.05) on radical innovation in the pre-launch 
phases. Long-term relationships also diminish coopetition’s effect on incremental innovation 
in the launch phase (ß= –.14, P<.05). These effects support coopetition as a dynamic process 
of value creation and appropriation (e.g. Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Despite 
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these additional findings, postulated main effects remained consistent after inclusion of latent 
interaction terms. 
We further checked the robustness of our findings to curvilinear trends by adding 
quadratic terms of manifest control variables and their respective interactions with linearly 
perceived coopetition intensity, resulting in more realistic models of conditionally monotone 
rather than conditionally linear relationships (Ganzach, 1998). All findings remained robust 
after inclusion of these additional parameters (e.g. for firm size: ßsize→rad=–.02, P>.10 and 
ßsize×coop→rad=.11, P<.01 yielded in ßsize→rad=–.00, P>.10; ßsize×size→rad=–.03, P>.10; 
ßsize×coop→rad=.10, P<.05 and ßsize×size×coop→rad=.06, P>.10). 
A post-hoc power analysis revealed that even after adjusting for attenuation bias of 
imperfect measurements, the achieved power level exceeds 80% for detection of small effects 
at 5% type-I error rates (f² >.02; Cohen, 1988). Finally, we conducted five hold-up samples to 
check for any potential threat of unobserved heterogeneity, randomly selecting 500 cases for 
each hold-up sample and re-running model estimations. All hold-up samples revealed 
variations of findings within a small range (P-values +/–0.05), indicating no serious threat of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Further, as an additional cross-validation of results, we utilize a qualitative repertory 
grid technique, which represents a personal construct theory originally derived from 
psychology and anthropology disciplines (Kelly, 1955; Lemke et al., 2010). We interviewed 
20 respondents from firms with coopetitive NPD alliances from the same population. The 
main aim of this cross-validation was to examine the sources of potential value creation and 
appropriation tension in coopetition, as well as the focal firm’s incremental and radical 
innovation outcomes. In Table 5, the numbered rows represent core constructs by which the 
respondents assess their coopetitive NPD alliances in comparison to either competitive or 
collaborative relationships. 
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Table 5. Qualitative cross-validation by using repertory grid technique 
construct pole – O competition cooperation coopetitive 
companies you 
deal with 
contrast pole – X 
 O X O X O X  
1. security - 20 17 3 3 14 uncertainty 
2. shared goals - 20 18 2 11 9 divergent goals 
3. low-risk - 6 5 4 3 12 high-risk 
4. incrementally 
innovative 
7 2 15 3 14 6 
not innovative 
5. radically innovative 1 16 3 10 13 6 not innovative 
 
Note: The number represents the number of respondents to each pole. 
 
The key constructs in the coopetition context were identified by frequency counts. We 
used the repertory grid to perform a principal component analysis of coopetition and examine 
the personal constructs which are grouped into a series of subsystems (Caldwell and Coshall, 
2002). The principal components in the coopetitive context are the uncertainty (X=14) as well 
as high-risk (X=12) nature of the relationship. The goal alignment between coopetitors is 
quite unevenly distributed between shared and divergent goals (O=11, X=9), which supports 
our expectation of the tension-laden context. Moreover, respondents related their coopetitive 
NPD relationships with the increase of both incremental and radical innovations in their 
product portfolio (O=14 & O=13), which supports the quantitative results of the main study.  
 
4. Results  
Table 6 summarizes control variables and their association with incremental and radical 
innovation outcomes in separate industry subsamples and an aggregated total sample without 
the postulated coopetition intensity associations. Table 7 shows the results of our hypotheses 
for aggregated single-group vs. multi-group comparisons. 
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Table 6. Control variables 
Relationship Aggregated data 
(N=1,049) 
Medicine devices 
(N=558) 
Machinery equipment 
(N=491) 
 Incremental 
outcomes 
Radical 
outcomes 
Incremental 
outcomes 
Radical 
outcomes 
Incremental 
outcomes 
Radical 
outcomes 
Industry –.01 –.01 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Launch –.04 –.05 –.04 –.04 –.03 –.08 
Duration .01 –.01 –.01 .04 .03 –.08 
Firm size .03 –.00 .03 –.02 .04 .05 
Firm age .00 –.15** .08 –.16* –.09 –.14** 
R&D intensity .11** .22*** .16** .24*** .05 .20*** 
    
Residual correlation 
of endogenous 
variables 
.47*** .42*** .54*** 
 
Overall fit:  
Aggregate ML: χ²(90)=356.23, p<.000, CFI=.93, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.053, SRMR=.038. 
Aggregate MLR: χ²(90)=302.75, p<.000, scaling correction factor=1.18, CFI=.93, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.047, 
SRMR=.038. 
Note: n/a=not available, sup=support, rej.=rejection. *** P<.001;** P<.01; * P<.05; † P<.10. 
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Table 7. Results: Hypotheses H1a–H2c 
Relationship Aggregated 
data 
(N=1,049) 
Medicine 
devices 
(N=558) 
Machinery 
equipment 
(N=491) 
(1) Pre-
launch 
phases 
(N=588) 
Hyp. 
results 
(2) Pre- and 
launch 
phases 
(N=316) 
(3) Launch  
phase only 
(N=145) 
Hyp. 
results 
χ²diff, MLR 
(d.f.diff) 
Launch → incremental –.03 –.03 –.03 n/a  n/a n/a   
Industry → incremental –.01 n/a n/a –.01  –.03 .02  0.19 (2) 
Duration → incremental  .01 –.02 .02 .07  .05 –.22*  7.01* (2) 
Firm size → incremental .01 .01 .01 –.05  .13 –.01  2.97 (2) 
Firm age → incremental .02 .09 –.07 .02  –.06 .03  0.58 (2) 
R&D intensity → incremental .09* .15** .03 .05  .06 .25*  3.07 (2) 
Coopetition intensity → incremental .14*** .12† .17** .14*  H1a: sup. .13  .24*  H2a: sup. 0.88 (2) 
          
Launch → radical –.05 –.04 –.08 n/a  n/a n/a   
Industry → radical –.01 n/a n/a –.03  .01 –.00  0.22 (2) 
Duration → radical  –.02 .04 –.08 .01  .03 –.16†  2.49 (2) 
Firm size → radical –.01 –.03 .01 –.01  –.02 .14  1.64 (2) 
Firm age → radical –.15** –.15** –.13† –.08  –.28*** –.22†  4.58 (2) 
R&D intensity → radical .22*** .24*** .19** .28***  .12 .23*  3.83 (2) 
Coopetition intensity → radical .06 .05 .07 .02 H1b: rej. .04 .22*  H2b: sup. 3.16 (2) 
       H2a < H2b H2c: rej. 0.03 (1) 
Means of coopetition .00 (fixed) .00 (fixed) .00 (fixed) .00 (fixed)  –.07 (freed) .04 (freed)   
          
Overall fit:  
Aggregate ML: χ²(128)=445.90, p<.000, CFI=.94, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.049, SRMR=.039. 
Aggregate MLR: χ²(128)=392.99, p<.000, scaling correction factor=1.13, CFI=.94, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.044, SRMR=.039. 
Medicine devices only ML: χ²(117)=306.25, p<.000, CFI=.93, TLI=.91, RMSEA=.054, SRMR=.047. 
Medicine devices only MLR: χ²(117)=273.13, p<.000, scaling correction factor=1.12, CFI=.93, TLI=.91, RMSEA=.049, SRMR=.047.  
Machinery equipment only ML: χ²(117)=260.77, p<.000, CFI=.94, TLI=.93, RMSEA=.050, SRMR=.045. 
Machinery equipment only MLR: χ²(117)=227.21, p<.000, scaling correction factor=1.15, CFI=.94, TLI=.93, RMSEA=.044, SRMR=.045. 
Multi-group ML: χ²(399)=776.99, p<.000, CFI=.93, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.052, SRMR=.058. 
Multi-group MLR: χ²(399)=709.13, p<.000, scaling correction factor=1.10, CFI=.93, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.047, SRMR=.058. 
Note: n/a=not available, sup.=support, rej.=rejection. *** P<.001;** P<.01; * P<.05; † P<.10. 
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The results support H1a that coopetition intensity in the pre-launch phase is positively 
associated with incremental innovation (H1a: ß=.14, P=.02), but is neither positively nor 
negatively significant for radical innovation (ß=.02, P=.69), rejecting H1b. Hypothesis 2 
considered coopetition intensity in the product launch phase of NPD. Results for the product 
launch phase show that coopetition intensity is positively associated with both incremental 
innovation (H2a: ß=.24, P=.03) and radical innovation (H2b: ß=.22, P=.02). H2c (that 
coopetition intensity in the launch phase is more effective for radical than for incremental 
innovation outcomes) was rejected (χ²diff,MLR=0.03, dfdiff=1, P=.86).  
The positive relationship of coopetition intensity and incremental innovation outcomes 
is independent not only of NPD phase but also of underlying industries. The only significant 
difference in the industry subsamples concerns incremental innovation outcomes through 
R&D intensity. In the medicine devices subsample, investments in R&D directly improve 
incremental innovation outcomes (ß=.15, P=.005), whereas in the machinery equipment 
subsample, there is no direct effect (ß=.03, P=.57). Radical innovation outcomes are directly 
improved by R&D intensity throughout all NPD phases and in both industry subsamples 
except for the mixed phases subsample. Firm size shows no linear association with innovation 
outcomes, whereas firm age diminishes radical innovation outcomes in all subsamples except 
for the pre-launch phases subsample. NPD alliances solely covering the launch phase are 
characterized by diminishing innovation outcomes for longer relationship durations indicating 
highest innovation outcomes directly after product launch.  
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5. Discussion and implications 
Coopetition is a paradoxical, tension-laden relationship (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Gnyawali et 
al., 2016), with both opportunities and drawbacks in joint innovation efforts (Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). We examined the role of coopetition intensity in pre-launch 
vs. launch phases of NPD alliances, along with its effects on incremental and radical 
innovation in the focal firm’s product range (see Table 8 for results summary).  
 
Table 8. Summary of the results 
Coopetition Focal firms’ incremental 
innovation 
Focal firms’ radical 
innovation 
Comparison 
Overall positive no effect Coopetition is better for 
incremental innovation 
 
Pre-launch phases 
 
positive 
 
 
no effect 
 
Coopetition is 
significantly better for 
incremental innovation 
 
Product launch phase positive positive no difference 
    
 
 
Overall, when combining all the NPD alliance phases to the analysis, the results show that 
increasing coopetition intensity has a positive relationship with incremental innovation 
outcomes in the focal firm’s product range. However, when the NPD alliance phases are 
separated, we find more distinctive evidence. The results show that the benefits of coopetition 
intensity for incremental innovation holds for both pre-launch and launch phases of NPD 
alliances, while focal firm’s radical innovations only increase along coopetition intensity in 
the product launch phase of NPD alliances. The implications of these results for coopetition, 
innovation and NPD research and practice are discussed below. 
 
5.1. Research implications 
In general, our findings provide support for the expectation that coopetition intensity 
influences the outcomes of the relationship (Park et al., 2014; Bengtsson et al., 2016). We 
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contribute to the coopetition literature by providing additional explanation for the previously 
mixed results over incremental and radical innovation outcomes (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014; 
Tidström, 2014; Le Roy and Fernandez, 2015; Bengtsson et al., 2016; Gnyawali et al., 2016; 
Ritala et al., 2016). Following the arguments of previous innovation research that NPD 
alliance stages have different levels of uncertainty (e.g. Song and Montoya‐Weiss, 1998; Reid 
and De Brentani, 2004), we examine separately the pre-launch and launch phases of 
coopetitive NPD alliances, and find observable differences in the implications of coopetition 
intensity for focal firm’s incremental and radical innovation. While coopetition research has 
suggested generally that activities far away from customer involve less tension (e.g. 
Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Walley, 2007), our results show that the high uncertainty of 
radical innovation activities in the pre-launch phase might lower the potential benefits of 
coopetition. 
 In relation to pre-launch phases, we theorized tensions due to uncertainty about 
eventual outcomes and vulnerability to knowledge spillover and opportunism, as well as 
difficulties in assessing how value creation informs eventual appropriation outcomes. We 
found that coopetition in the pre-launch phases of NPD alliances is beneficial only for 
incremental innovation (supporting H1a), which is understandable in light of earlier research 
suggesting that incremental innovation entails lower risks and tensions than radical innovation 
(e.g. Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Ritala and Sainio, 
2014).  
With regard to radical innovation, the negative hypothesis (H1b) was not supported, 
but the non-significant result points out towards the stronger benefits of incremental 
innovation. This aligns with some of the earlier findings of Nieto and Santamaría (2007) and 
Ritala and Sainio (2014), who reported that coopetition is not particularly beneficial for 
radical innovation. However, a number of other studies have identified benefits from early-
phase coopetition for radical innovation (Gnyawali et al., 2006) or for radical innovation in 
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general (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2012; Bouncken and Kraus, 2013). By examining different 
stages of NPD alliances, we are able to distinguish when coopetition intensity is beneficial to 
radical innovation (latter stages), and when it is less beneficial (pre-launch stages). In fact, the 
early-phase radical innovation development might encounter the ‘paradox of openness’ 
(Laursen and Salter, 2014), where knowledge exchange is important for creating the diversity, 
while at the same time firms see great risks in investments and knowledge flow. Indeed, the 
negative tensions in early-phase coopetition relate to uncertainty, high inputs without clear 
vision of appropriable outputs, as well as knowledge sharing and protection challenges (see 
e.g. Le Roy and Fernandez, 2015), coupled with expectations related to serendipitous 
findings, open knowledge exchange and creation of new knowledge. As Raza-Ullah et al. 
(2014) put it, “simultaneous experience of both positive and negative emotions forms the 
basis of tension in coopetition” (p. 17), and this may account for the non-significant results for 
radical innovation. 
In the product launch phase of NPD alliances, our hypotheses (H2a-b) were supported, 
in that coopetition intensity promotes both incremental and radical innovation for the focal 
firm. This aligned with our theorizing that greater closeness to end markets prompts clarity, 
reducing uncertainties, and ultimately lowering tensions. As an additional benefit of the 
product launch phase, competing firms can pool their resources and capabilities to better 
penetrate markets and facilitate diffusion of jointly developed incremental and radical 
innovations. These findings align with Bouncken and Kraus (2013), who related the positive 
effect of coopetition on radical innovation to reduced uncertainty. In this less uncertain launch 
phase of NPD projects, firms in coopetition can more safely rely on the advantages of shared 
technological and market understanding, as they have less proprietary knowledge to protect 
and more to gain from coopetition. Diminished ambiguity allows firms to define sub-tasks 
and exploit combinative potential, and coopetitors can more easily distribute tasks between 
them (Thölke et al., 2001; Frattini et al., 2013). We also hypothesised that coopetition 
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intensity in the launch phase of NPD (H2c) would be more beneficial for outcomes of focal 
firms’ radical innovationa, as the markets are less crowded, and there is more space to create 
new markets, in partnership as well as individually. However, we found no support for this 
hypothesis, as coopetition intensity was almost equally beneficial to both types of innovation. 
Finally, we found that NPD alliances having both pre-launch and launch phases do not 
produce significant results in terms of incremental or radical innovation. This supports the 
relevance of empirically separating between the phases, but also highlights the potential 
tensions over value creation and appropriation that might emerge in such multi-dimensional 
relationships. 
 
5.2. Managerial implications 
Based on our findings, it seems that firms should seek coopetitive partners for incremental 
product and technology development initiatives at all phases of NPD. However, firms need to 
be more cautious about coopetition for radical innovation, if possible selecting the less 
uncertain later phases of the project. Firms pursuing radical innovation should take account of 
the necessary knowledge exchange with competitors and how they can safeguard their 
proprietary knowledge to avoid tensions and reduce risks. To this end, firms should assess the 
innovation’s novelty and then select the appropriate phase of the NPD process. The search for 
partners may take some time, but this should not be a problem during the early phases. Given 
the possible leakage of ideas and knowledge to competitors, firms should not approach 
potential coopetitors too early or unprepared, and choose their partners wisely.  
Knowledge sharing tensions can also be handled through appropriate managerial 
practices and organizational mechanisms. Openness offers tremendous advantages through 
idea generation, change and recombination, but also brings opportunism. Coopetitors may 
therefore establish formal and informal agreements (which this study did not consider) to 
allow openness in pre-launch phases for radical innovation (see e.g. Estrada et al., 2015). 
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Pursuit of both relational and firm-specific goals requires that firms develop mechanisms for 
open communication about strategic objectives (see e.g. Le Roy and Fernandez, 2015; 
Bouncken et al., 2016a). Coopetitors can also use knowledge-related practices, principles and 
actual knowledge protection mechanisms such as intellectual property rights and contracts 
(Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). With regard to the individual-level, emotional 
roots of tensions (e.g. Le Roy and Fernandez, 2015; Gnyawali et al., 2016), firms could 
develop instruments and practices to make it easier to work under emotional ambivalence 
(Raza-Ullah et al., 2014), potentially leading to better outcomes for early-stage coopetition in 
radical innovation.   
  
5.3. Limitations and future research directions 
Like all empirical research, the present study has several limitations. First, our data are 
sourced solely from Germany, which is one of the few European countries thriving 
economically at the time. The results may also differ for different types of firm (e.g. family-
owned, private company, public company etc.). Second, we used key informants (top-level 
managers) as the only source of information. Although they are usually considered the “single 
most knowledgeable and valid information sources” (Lechner et al., 2006, p. 525), future 
research might also seek out a second source, either internally or externally (e.g. the 
coopetition partner). Third, our sample is not limited to alliances between direct competitors 
with full market overlap only, as it examines NPD alliances that experience different levels of 
coopetition intensity. It should thus be noted that also alliances between non-competitors are 
included to assure a representative sample of NPD alliances in general. The benefit from this 
approach is that we decrease endogeneity and tautological nature of our perceptional 
coopetition measure that best describes an alliance partner as a close competitor (=.93).  
Future research should also look beyond bilateral NPD alliances to multi-actor 
relationships (e.g., Bouncken et al., 2016b), such as innovation networks and ecosystems in 
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which coopetition plays a major role (e.g. Gueguen, 2009). In these contexts, the complexity 
of coopetitive value creation and appropriation increases, requiring new types of analysis. 
Future studies could also probe more deeply into the dynamics of coopetitive value creation 
and appropriation. While the present study demonstrated how coopetition in different phases 
affects focal firms’ innovation outcomes, it seems important to investigate the dynamics of 
value creation and appropriation in coopetition relationships over time and in greater detail. 
For instance, examining the timing and overlap of product launches by competitors in a 
coopetitive NPD alliance could provide more understanding of these temporal dynamics. 
Furthermore, future studies could examine the role of safeguard and appropriability 
mechanisms (such as patents, contracts and secrecy) in coopetitive NPD, since they might 
affect the innovation outcomes and value appropriation (e.g. Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2013).  
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